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INTRODUCTION  
Discursive constructionism (henceforth sometimes DC) is most distinctive in its 
foregrounding of the epistemic position of both the researcher and what is researched (texts or 
conversations).  It studies a world of descriptions, claims, reports, allegations and assertions as 
parts of human practices, and it works to keep these as the central topic of research rather than 
trying to move beyond them to the objects or events that seem to be the topic of such discourse.  
It is radically constructionist in that it is sceptical of any guarantee beyond local and contingent 
texts, claims, arguments, demonstrations, exercises of logic and procedures of empiricism and so 
on.  In this sense it can be described as anti-foundationalist and poststructuralist.  It takes 
seriously the work in rhetoric and the sociology of scientific knowledge that highlights the 
contingent, normative and constructive work that goes into, say, logical demonstrations, 
mathematical proofs or experimental replications.  Like much work in the sociology of scientific 
knowledge is methodologically relativist in that it systematically avoids starting with one party’s 
version of events, actors or structures as true or given (Ashmore, 1989).   
Although DC appears to have a narrow topic – discourse – its power comes from its 
central role in human affairs.  Discourse is the fundamental medium for action.  It is the medium 
through which versions of the world are constructed and made urgent or reworked as trivial and 
irrelevant.  For social scientists working with DC the study of discourse becomes the central way 
of studying mind, social processes, organizations and events as they are continually made live in 
human affairs. 
This chapter will be organized into three sections.  The first overviews the central 
elements of discursive constructionism and highlights what makes it distinctive from alternative 
constructionisms.  The second section describes the operation of discursive constructionism as an 
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analytic project that studies the procedures through which versions are built, established and 
made independent of their authors.  This will be illustrated through an extended analysis of fact 
constructional in a single account.  The third section explores the power of a discursive 
constructionist approach by considering its operation in realms that on first sight appear to defy 
discourse constructionist analysis: death and furniture, social structure and context, embodiment, 
emotion and experience.  In each case discursive analyses are offered that illustrate the radical 
power and potential of this approach.  
ELEMENTS OF DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTIONISM 
Discourse is most simply defined as texts and talk as parts of social practices (Potter, 
1996).  That is, it works with the sense of discourse as a verb rather than a noun.  Thus discourse 
in DC can include conversations, arguments, talk in work settings, professional client interaction, 
the various situations where interaction is mediated and supported by technology (phones, visual 
displays, instruments etc.), and any occasion where people are doing things involving some form 
of interaction.   Occasionally DC will work with open ended interviews, but these will be treated 
as interactional events rather than as places where participants’ views can be excavated (Potter & 
Hepburn, 2005).  This commitment to discourse involves considering the live delivery of talk 
with its stress and emphasis, silence and overlap.  Although it does not have to be exclusively 
verbal and linguistic, there is a commitment to approaching non-discursive material via the 
orientations of participants.   The focus on discourse rather than language signals an approach 
that is focused on action and practice rather than linguistic structure.  
DC does not adopt the extended notion of discourse used in some of Foucault’s work.  
For example, at points in Discipline and Punish (1979) Foucault treats discourse variously as 
including institutions, institutional practices (e.g. for dealing with abnormality), the archived set 
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of ‘statements’ that embody the founding of the institution, the rules of inclusion and exclusion, 
the physical architecture of prisons, decisions about sentencing, scientific criminology, 
moralizing and philanthropy.  DC has a more restricted notion of discourse; however, that does 
not mean that the sort of analytic work involved in DC might not address several of the 
phenomena that for Foucault constitute a discourse, nor that it might not draw on some of 
Foucault’s insights about institutions, practice and the nature of subjectivity. The virtue of the 
notion of discourse in DC is its precision and its fittedness to a particular analytic practice. 
DC draws on conversation analytic (CA) methods and findings.  It is distinctive from CA, 
however, precisely because of its foregrounding of construction as an issue.  Nevertheless, in 
considering how versions are assembled in talk and texts its practice parallels that of 
conversation analysis.  There are differences in the approach taken to cognition, with some 
conversation analysts being willing to consider cognition as a realm to be connected to 
interaction rather than something studyable as an object in and for interaction in the manner of 
discursive constructionism (Potter & te Molder, 2005).  So the differences are subtle and, as 
Wooffitt (2005) shows, there are important areas of overlap.  Indeed, in the past few years 
conversation analytic work has started to bring to fore the kinds of epistemic issues that have 
been at the centre of discursive constructionism (e.g. Clift, 2006).   
One way of understanding discursive constructionism, is as research tradition where 
epistemics are perpetually live for both researchers and researched and where any conclusions 
may apply just as much to the researcher’s own discourse as the discourse under study.  In this 
sense, DC is a reflexively mature practice.  Indeed, DC itself is an approach whose justification 
is not foundational.  It is warranted by a weave of arguments and illustrations, and stands insofar 
as it can counter or improve on or reinterpret analyses from alternative perspectives that work 
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with assumptions that are realist, positivist, symbolic interactionist, social cognitionist or 
whatever.  Note that DC is not a programme that suggests that social phenomena do not have 
objectivity reality (Hammersley, 2003); to deny such things would be as realist a move as 
endorsing them (Edwards, Ashmore & Potter, 1995).  Rather DC consider the role of 
‘phenomena’ in terms of the different descriptions, glosses, categories and orientations offered 
by social actors (Potter, 2003). 
This approach to constructionism was developed by the discourse analytic tradition 
within the sociology of scientific knowledge (e.g. Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984) and within the 
broader discourse analytic tradition that developed within social psychology (e.g. Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987 – see Hepburn, 2003 for an overview).  This chapter will draw in particular on 
the systematic manifesto for a discursive constructionism by Jonathan Potter (1996).  The 
chapter offers a constructionist and inevitably constructive account of a range of work in 
discourse analysis, discursive psychology, ethnomethodology, and conversation analysis.  The 
latter approaches are not always identified as constructionist – however, this chapter is working 
with a specific sense of constructionism and a specific reading of parts of those literatures (see 
Wooffitt, 2005). 
Senses of construction 
Discursive constructionism works with two senses of construction.  On the one hand, 
discourse is constructed in the sense that it is assembled from a range of different resources with 
different degrees of structural organization.  Most fundamentally these are words and 
grammatical structures, but also broader elements such as categories, metaphors, idioms, 
rhetorical commonplaces and interpretative repertoires.  For example, how is a description 
manufactured in a way that presents something that has been done as orderly and unproblematic?  
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People are extremely skilled builders of descriptions; they have spent a lifetime learning how to 
do it.  Part of the analytic art of DC is to reveal the complex and delicate work that goes into this 
seemingly effortless building.  
On the other hand, discourse is constructive in the sense that these assemblages of words, 
repertoires and so on put together and stabilize versions of the world, of actions and events, of 
mental life and furniture.  For example, how does one party in a relationship counselling session 
construct a version that presents the breakdown of a long term relationship as primarily the 
responsibility of the other party, who might be the one most in need of counselling and under 
most pressure to change (Edwards, 1995)?  Crucially, then, discursive constructionism is 
dynamic; these assemblages of symbolic resources that construct versions are organized for 
action rather than some abstract principle of accurate description.   
In DC discourse is understood as situated.  First, it is situated in the sequential 
environment that is basic to interaction.  It follows on, and orients to, the immediately prior talk, 
and provides the environment for what immediately follows.  In the case of texts, they may be 
invoked as a part of some practice.  The screen prompts may be voiced by the dispatcher in an 
emergency 911 call; some elements of a medical record may be referenced in a multiprofessional 
team meeting to allocate elderly care; a newspaper report may be invoked or quoted in an 
argument about extremism and asylum.  Second, discourse is situated institutionally.  It is 
generated within, and gives sense and structure to, practices such as news interviews, air traffic 
instructions and family meals.  Third, discourse is situated rhetorically.  That is, constructions in 
talk are often built in a way that counters relevant alternatives. 
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Linguistic and Discursive Constructionism 
Let us try further to clarify this sense of construction by contrasting it to the influential 
linguistic constructionism of Benjamin Whorf (1956).  Famously linguistic constructionism, 
incorporating the work of the linguist Sapir as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, stimulated a large 
body of psychological research.  The idea was that linguistic categories constructed the 
perceptual world for language users in a speech community.  Thus Inuit tribes could ‘see’ fine 
distinctions between different kinds of snow as a result of the elaborate snow vocabulary that 
they have available that allowed them to (mentally) categorize wet snow, snow that had just 
fallen, snow that had frozen hard and so on.  This kind of constructionism is linguistic (as it 
depends on the available linguistic categories) but is also cognitivist (as the construction 
processes are taken to operate at the level of perception and cognition).   
Whorf worked for a firm that assessed insurance risks and he used this as an example to 
illustrate linguistic constructionism.  Employees of a company had described a set of drums as 
‘empty’ and therefore safe; but the drums were actually ‘full’ of inflammable gasoline vapour.  
The employees’ use of linguistic categories such as empty structured their understanding in a 
misleading manner; if they had used a different category – ‘full’ – their would have understood 
the drums as presenting much more of a risk.  In Whorf’s view language constructs the 
perception of the world.   
The discursive constructionism outlined in this chapter takes a different approach to the 
operation of categories.  Stimulated by work in ethnomethodology and particularly the writings 
of Harvey Sacks (1992) it considers categories not as templates for perception and information 
processing but as resources for action.  As Derek Edwards (1991) puts it, categories are for 
talking (not for seeing, thinking, reasoning).  DC is not treating language as a grid or system of 
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classification lying between a static individual perceiver and the world; rather language operates 
in social practices.  That is precisely why we are writing about discursive rather than linguistic 
constructionism.    
Returning to Whorf’s gasoline drums Edwards (1994) wonders what the employees who 
talked to Whorf were doing with their descriptions.  For example, in the context of an insurance 
claim the categorization ‘the drums were empty’ might be offered as an account.  That is, not as 
direct report of a way of seeing the world but as a practical move in a particular piece of 
institutional interaction where blame (whose fault was the fire) and practical consequences (who 
is going to pay for the damage) are paramount.  The point is not that Whorf’s employee 
respondents are not describing the world and classifying it in a way that offers a particular 
construction.  Rather it is that we need to understand the way the construction is oriented to the 
particular actions.  These actions are situated in what the employees said to Whorf and in the 
institutional practices of insurance assessment; the description ‘empty’ rhetorically counters the 
relevant alternative that they are ‘full’ of dangerous vapour. 
Discourse, Construction and Cognition 
In Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s (1966) original manifesto for social 
constructionist sociology they offer what in more recent sociology of scientific knowledge would 
be glossed as a ‘symmetrical’ stance to knowledge (Collins, 1981).  That is, they were concerned 
with what passes as knowledge regardless of its validity from the perspective any social group.  
This symmetrical stance is a key element in the discursive constructionism described here.   
For example, when approaching legal discourse from a DC perspective we are not 
required to know the outcome of the trial, whether witnesses were lying, whether an acquitted 
defendant was actually guilty.  All these practical matters are for the various actors involved to 
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argue over using the resources at their disposal (see e.g. Drew, 1992).  Just as sociologists of 
science need not know physics better than physicists to study physics, so DC researchers do not 
need to know the law, say, better than lawyers to study legal discourse.  The domain of study is 
discourse practices and the constructive work embedded in those practices.  None of this is to say 
that (a) work on legal discourse might not have broader implications including implications for 
the verdicts of trials; (b) DC researchers might not develop a sophisticated understanding of legal 
practices; (c) that the researchers might personally have strong opinions about, say, the outcome 
of specific trials or issues such as politics or gender in sentencing, as these latter things come into 
the courtroom in terms of categories and orientations that are appropriate objects of study.  The 
point of methodological relativism here is to avoid research being based on a particular version 
of the law, or a particular side in court cases, which risks turning it into a social science 
restatement of any current legal status quo (see Potter, 1996, ch.1).  Berger and Luckmann had 
an important early grasp of the general requirement for this kind of symmetry. 
However, when Berger and Luckmann consider specific cases they do so by starting with 
the phenomenology of individual experience: 
The reality of everyday life is organized around the ‘here’ of my body and the ‘now’ of my present.  
This ‘here and now’ is the focus of my attention to the reality of everyday life.  What is ‘here and 
now’ presented to me in everyday life is the realissimum of my consciousness. (1966: 36) 
That is, they offer a variety of cognitive constructionism.  Instead of studying processes of 
constructing in texts and talk, the building of versions etc., they are working with perception and 
understanding.   
We will outline three drawbacks of cognitive versions of constructionism. First, if 
construction is cognitive what is the status of what is constructed?  This is the question rightly 
highlighted by Ian Hacking (1999).  Is it a representation?  Is it therefore some mental image or 
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picture?   And if it is a mental picture how can this be the topic of constructionist research?  If it 
enters into research through a description (in an open ended interview, say) this process will 
itself be using the very category system that is central to processes of construction.  Should this 
further constructive process be ignored?  For some critical linguists who take a broadly cognitive 
constructionist approach these problems are not insurmountable (van Dijk, 1998; Wodak, 2006); 
however, discursive constructionism avoids this set of problems by taking a practical and 
interactional approach rather than a cognitive one (for comments on broadly cognitive 
constructionist approaches in social psychology and sociolinguistics see Potter & Edwards, 1999, 
2001).   
A second drawback of cognitive constructionism is that it separates representations from 
practices.  The representations become things that are constructed within actors and are carried 
around by actors in the form of cognitive representations.  This separation makes it harder to 
focus on the way the representations (constructions, versions) are built within settings to perform 
particular actions.  For example, we can consider, as Steven Clayman and John Heritage (2002) 
do, how news interview questions can include a preface that is specifically designed to raise 
issues (perhaps a topical agenda or an action agenda) that will challenge the interviewee and help 
generate a revealing answer that is ‘good television’.  To study this Clayman and Heritage 
consider the different elements that can go into the building of such a preface and how it works 
as part of a broader news interview question.   This analysis does not assume that the interviewer 
has a mental representation of the question preface, nor that it is something transported around 
with them.  DC will start with the practical and analytically available version in the question and 
the rich interactional evidence that comes from studying the building of the question preface in 
situ.   
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The third drawback of cognitive constructionism is that cognition is pervasively both the 
topic of talk and a resource for constructing versions.  DC is ontologically indifferent to whether 
the versions being studied are of some historical events, of some physical or geographical 
objects, or are part of the mental thesaurus of some culture, although of course distinctions 
between these realms may at times be highly consequential in all kinds of ways in the texts or 
interactions being studied.  One of the features of talk highlighted by discursive psychology is 
that descriptions of ‘the world’ and of ‘mind’ are commonly mutually implicative (Edwards, 
2005).  People may bolster versions of events by using cognitive constructions (good memories, 
direct perception, and so on) and bolster versions of their cognition (their attitude toward 
something or their motive for acting) by developing specific versions of how the world is.   
For example, when callers to a child protection helpline develop their reasons for calling 
they recurrently described themselves as ‘concerned’ or ‘worried’ about a child (Potter & 
Hepburn, 2003).  Such ‘cognitive’ constructions can be understood locally as building an 
appropriate psychological stance on the abuse for the helpline (caring, concerned, not indifferent 
or enjoying it) and also building a finely tuned knowledgeability.  The ‘concern’ constructs the 
caller as not in a state where the abuse is certain (and they therefore should already have 
contacted the police or social services); rather they speak from a position of concern which can 
be collaboratively unpacked with the Child Protection Officer.  The psychological matters here 
are inseparable from the practical and institutional business of the helpline.  Attitude and 
knowledge are developed and attended to as matters of local relevance.  In DC such things are 
studied in terms of their construction in discourse. 
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ACCOMPLISHING CONSTRUCTIONS 
The disciplines that study the operation of discourse – some varieties of discourse 
analysis, some styles of rhetorical analysis, discursive psychology, major parts of 
ethnomethodology and conversation analysis – are constructionist insofar as they consider how 
talk and texts are assembled and how those assemblages work to accomplish actions.  However, 
some of this work has focused in particular on the way descriptions are built as objective, as 
independent of the speaker and credible (Potter, 1996; Smith, 1978; Wooffitt, 1992).  This work 
studied the practical task of accomplishing a construction that can shrug off its own constructed 
status.  Potter (1996) distinguishes the action orientation of talk and texts from their 
epistemological orientation.  The former body of work is focused on action orientation (how 
discourse accomplishes actions) while the latter work is focused on epistemological orientation 
(how discourse is built as factual).  Of course, in practice this distinction is heuristic rather than 
absolute.  The construction of facts is itself done actively and the accomplishment of actions 
continually implicates epistemic issues (cf. Heritage & Raymond, 2005). 
Given the space limitations of a single chapter we will give a single illustrative example 
that brings together, and introduces, a range of the phenomena of fact construction in a compact 
way.  This section will focus on the epistemological orientation of talk in a description of some 
strange events.  In his path breaking work on fact construction Wooffitt (1992) focused on 
accounts of paranormal events.  One of the features of accounts of ghosts, poltergeists, UFOs and 
other extraordinary events is that when they are delivered to researchers or other ‘non-believers’ 
they are built to resist scepticism.  And precisely because they have so much work to do to build 
a convincing description of events they provide an exquisite natural laboratory for the study of 
fact construction.  We have chosen the following example as it packs in a range of features of 
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fact construction in a relatively short extract.  The extract is transcribed using Gail Jefferson’s 
(2004) now standard system for representing the elements of speech (emphasis, overlap, etc.) 
that have been found to be interactionally live.  This might seem unfamiliar or confusing at first 
but, as we show, these features of delivery are analytically consequential. 
 
Carrie’s Story 
Interviewer:  Okay, so when you’re ready can you tell  
    me about your paranormal experience  
    in your own words. 
1 
2 
3 
4     (0.4) 
Carrie:   Oka:y, (.) UM (.) my house has got  
    
5 
quite (.) a lot’ve (0.6) em stori:es, 
    (0.2) 
6 
7 
Carrie:   Um main one was prob’lly whe:n (.) I  
    woke up in the morning, (0.4) a:n:d um 
8 
9 
    I (0.2) >sorta< looked out in the garden.  10 
11     ((tape disruption)) (and there was) a      
    figure, (.) standi:ng (0.5) quite far (up)  
    my garden (0.2) um: in a sor’ve 
12 
night  
    dress, (0.2) .hh a:n my 
13 
instant reaction 
    was: (.) it was: my mother:, (0.2) .hh  
14 
15 
16     um an:d  I sord’ve >I din’t look< (0.3)  
17 
18 
19 
20 
    that lon:g, (.) but I went into: my parents’  
    bedroo:m, (.) and my mum was in bed?  
    (0.2)  
Carrie:   .hh an >so I was like< (.) that’s a bit  
    weir:d, (.) but (.) it was kind of (0.3) 21 
22     (0.4) (the reason) why >it really freaked  
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    me out a lot< was cos it was like a figure  
    in a 
23 
night dress:, like looking  24 
25 
26 
    up at my bedroo:m?  
    (0.2)  
Carrie:   .hh [an::d that’s quite sc]ar:y I think.  27 
28 
29 
Interviewer: [ ° o o h : : : : : °  ] 
((29 secs omitted; story about unexpected luck with dice)) 
Carrie:   .hh A:N:D: (0.2) U:H: once me and my  30 
31 
32 
    sister were- (.) u:m in the kitchen  
    cooking, (0.3) a::nd: (0.2) u:hh (0.4)  
33     we both star’ed laugh:ing because there  
34     was >sor’ve like< (.) a really: (0.9)  
35 
36 
    like <really deep growly> noise? 
    (0.2) 
Carrie:   .Hh (.) an: we were both laughing  37 
38     and going- I >said to her y’know< 
    why di’you make that noise.  39 
40     (.) 
Carrie:   and she got really freaked ou:t an 41 
    said that (0.2) I’d made it.  
    (0.2)  
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
Carrie:   .h an it’s because< it came from  
    right (.) (th’other) side of our  
    fa:ces,  
    (0.2)  
Carrie:   .hh an it was like a properly (0.7)  48 
    scary kin’ve animal growling noise,  49 
50     (0.4) .hh umm and we got quite  
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51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
    freaked out.  
    (0.3)  
Carrie:   U::m (0.2) 
Int:     Ur↑::uh:. 
    (0.2)
 
There are a large number of different discourse practices that are involved in the 
construction of versions that can be treated as solid or independent of the speaker.   For 
simplicity, and somewhat arbitrarily we have divided them into three classes: category 
entitlement and interest management, the discursive psychology of mind/world relationships, 
practices of narration. 
Category entitlement and interest management 
One of the things that Sacks emphasised in his early work on conversation was the 
relationship of categories to particular kinds of speaker entitlements (Sacks, 1992).  For example, 
it is the witness to a horrific auto accident who has the right to the bad experience (to feel awful, 
have their day ruined).  Categories can be normatively tied to a range of different psychological 
states and characteristics, including knowledge.  In some cases this is explicit and institutionally 
warranted – doctors know about medicine through training, exams and practice.  Other 
categories are much more permeable and occasioned, with their memberships open to being 
worked up, undermined or discounted in a range of ways.  For example, the categories ‘witness’ 
and ‘ordinary person’ do not require a uniform, a membership certificate or other official and 
public category ratification.  However, they are associated with particular kinds of 
knowledgeability. 
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On the one hand, categories can often entitle speakers to knowledge; on the other, 
interests can undermine or discount that entitlement.  The notion of interests (and related notions 
such as stake) can be used to suggest that a speaker (in their individual or institutional capacity) 
has something to gain or loose; they have a stake in a course of action that the description relates 
to.  Indeed, descriptions can be pervasively heard against a backdrop of potential competences, 
projects, motives and allegiances.  They can be understood as the product of prejudice or 
stupidity or a huge variety of other things that can undercut or reinterpret claims.  Speakers 
pervasively attend to the potential for their talk being treated as interested, particularly (but not 
exclusively) in situations of conflict or dispute.  At times interests that are counter to what might 
be expected in making a claim may be invoked (‘stake inoculation’ – see Potter, 1996).   
We will illustrate these features of the work of construction with examples from Carrie’s 
account above.  First note how in line 6 Carrie does not restate (either in the same words or new 
but equivalent words) the Interviewer’s description ‘paranormal experience’.  The formulation 
Carrie uses is the much less epistemically committed ‘stories’.  Moreover, these are tied to the 
house rather than the speaker.  At the outset of the account, then, the speaker avoiding explicit 
references that presuppose the reality of, or belief in, the paranormal event.  Wooffitt (1992) 
found this kind of ‘oblique reference’ to be a recurrent feature of the openings of paranormal 
accounts. 
In a similar way in line 14, Carrie describes her first reaction to the figure in the garden is 
that it is her mother.  That is, she presents her first reaction as a mundane or ordinary one, the 
kind of reaction that anyone might have.  Note also that it is presented as ‘instant’ – something 
that came naturally rather something that is thought through.  In terms of categories and interests 
we can see these kinds of descriptive practices as presenting the speaker as acting from a 
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category of ‘mundane persons’ and not from the sort of category (sci fi nut? mystic?) that might 
have an interest in the reality of paranormal events (cf. Sacks, 1984).  One of the features of 
these descriptive practices is that they are inexplicit – neither the categories nor the interests are 
spelled out in a way that might draw attention to them or open them to easy counter. 
Other details of the account work in the same way.  Note how Carrie and her sister are 
described as cooking in the kitchen – the sort of mundane activity that ordinary people engage in.  
And, rhetorically and relevantly, they are not described as talking about ghosts and apparitions or 
their fascination with the occult.  Then when the noise happens Carrie describes their first 
reaction as laughter.  That is, their reaction is to something they immediately see as ordinary 
rather than strange or frightening.  More generally, these descriptive practices illustrate the 
important and subtle attention that can be paid to category entitlement and interest management 
in factual accounts. 
The discursive psychology of mind/world relationships 
One of the features of the way talk and texts operate that has been highlighted in 
discursive psychology is that there are complex reflexive relationships between descriptions of 
the world and descriptions of mental states (Edwards, 2005).  As speakers provide reports of 
events which attend to issues of causality, action and accountability in those events so, 
simultaneously, they are inevitably displaying or managing their own accountability in the 
provision of the report.  This means that constructions of mind and constructions of reality 
operate together as parts of practices.   
When we write about ‘constructions’ this term can suggest something simple like a 
picture or vignette of some kind.  However, one of the features that conversation analytic work in 
particular has emphasised is the importance of considering not merely reports of mental states 
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and furniture, but displays of those things.  Thus understanding, stance, confusion, become 
things that are displayed through talk in a variety of ways and in doing so they make available 
inferences about actions, events, structures and so on.  The structuring here can be complex.  For 
example, Edwards (2000) developed Anita Pomerantz’s (1986) work on extreme case 
formulations (ECFs) that are constructions of events that use extreme expressions such as 
always, brand new, as good as it gets, perfectly and so on.  Edwards shows up the way such 
formulations can be ways of doing ‘nonliteral’ (not accountably accurate) but instead can be used 
to display some speaker investment in, or stance to, what is described.  For example, an ECF can 
be used to display a commitment or caring stance to what is described.   
The materials in Carrie’s story above are a narrative account of events rather than 
elements in an action such as an invitation.  Nevertheless, we can consider the role of the mutual 
implications between reality and psychology as developed in the account.  Note, for example, the 
mental state construction ‘freaked out’ on 22.  Freaked out is an idiomatic and somewhat 
extreme construction of the speaker’s mental state; as such it implicates some feature of the 
world that is responsible for the freaking out, and provides at least an outline construction of 
some of its features – it is capable of invoking a state of being freaked out.  The point here is 
simple, but fundamental: the psychological construction works to build the reality. 
There are two more things to note about this that have broader relevance to studying 
construction in action.  First, note that Carrie’s (retrospective) construction of her mental state as 
‘freaked out’ does not just work to build the reality of the strange or paranormal object.  It also 
simultaneously constructs herself as someone who is freaked out by weird or strange events.  
That is, her response is a normal or mundane one; it simultaneously constructs the object as 
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having that effect and her identity as someone who is a member of the appropriate category to 
give credible or perhaps disinterested accounts of paranormal events. 
Second, note the interactional organization here.  All of this work with categories, interest 
management and displays of inferentially rich mental states unfolds interactionally.  Although 
what Carrie produces is a story (or perhaps a series of stories) on a topic, it does not exist as an 
abstract text set against the interaction.  It is elicited by a very specific question and it is recipient 
designed throughout.  While a Bakhtinian perspective might tune us into the dialogic nature of 
even written texts such as novels, the conversation analytic understanding of recipient design 
combined with the attention it focuses on recipiency is particularly revealing.   
Thus we can note that the first part of the story comes to a potential completion at the 
point where Carrie describes finding her mum in bed (line 18).  It is at this point that the instant, 
mundane explanation of the figure in the garden is revealed as wrong (to Carrie in the story 
narration, and to the Interviewer in ‘story time’).  This completion is underscored by the 
questioning intonation on the term ‘bed’ that indicates that some response is appropriate.  
However, what we see at this transition relevant place is a brief but significant silence.  The 0.2 
seconds on line 19 is enough to cue Carrie that no response from the Interviewer is forthcoming 
and indeed she continues after a brief inbreath.  What Carrie does is continue with spelling out 
the upshot of the mum being in bed that the Interviewer failed to do (maybe because they have 
been inattentive or because they are following the interview guidelines to interact only 
minimally).  It is ‘weird’ (another psychologically inferential category) and then an upgrade to 
‘freaked out’.  However, even after this, the Interviewer fails to come in at a new appropriate 
position for a response (line 26) and Carrie spells out the upshot one further time ‘that’s quite 
scary’.   
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It is only at this point, and in overlap, that the Interviewer produces an extended and 
expressive news receipt (cf. Heritage, 1984).  The extreme extension of the news receipt may 
mark the lateness of the recognition of what is precisely newsworthy here; and the quietness is a 
way of providing emphasis this is perhaps appropriate for the ghost story genre.  (Something 
similar happens on 52-54 where the Interviewer responds late, but again does an exaggerated and 
expressive news receipt).  As before, we see the psychological display in the news receipt is a 
reflexive marker of the nature of the object of the story, and shows the way it is here being 
jointly constituted. 
Practices of narration 
  When speakers assemble narrative descriptions of actions and events there are a wide 
range of resources they can draw on to construct and manage the factuality of what is described.  
For example, the apparatus of footing that Goffman (1981) deliniated is available for marking 
the positions and views of a set of narrative characters in a set of consequentially different ways 
(as origin of a view, for example, or relayer of another’s view).  Wooffitt (1992) found in his 
study of paranormal accounts that ‘active voicing’ of the words and even thoughts of the 
characters in the story was a common and important element in the construction of factuality.  
For example, corroboration can be produced by actively voicing different characters into 
agreement over some state of affairs and using specific reported speech (often with vivid 
prosodic marking) can suggest that the speaker actually witnessed some event.   
Edwards and Potter (1992) highlight the role of linguistic detail in the construction of 
narrative in both producing particular kinds of actions (such as criticisms or accounts) and in 
providing a sense of being present as a witness.  A description that is detailed and vivid, perhaps 
offering descriptions from a place or point of view (as might be seen by a single observer) can 
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work through category entitlement.  The category witness is one of the most powerful in factual 
accounting and vivid detail is one way of showing membership of such a category.   
In effect, narratives of this kind are proto forms of the novelist’s art, where plot. character 
and motivation can be worked up.  As with novels the author is massively powerful with control 
over the descriptive language used, where the narrative starts and finishes, what is included and 
what is omitted (as understood from a competing narrative).  In DC one of the features of 
narratives is that they are seen, as other discourse practices, as embedded in particular settings 
and having a particular interactional order.  Conversation analysts have highlighted a range of 
structural properties of narrative (Schegloff, 1997a) while discursive psychologists have 
emphasised their rhetorical organization (Edwards, 1997).   
Such an approach to narrative starts with stories or narratives told in settings such as 
family telephone calls, relationship counselling sessions or political controversies rather than 
seeing narratives as something abstract that can be elicited as a complete and decontextualized 
entity such as a life story (e.g. Wortham, 2001).  This approach contrasts to some other 
constructionist and postmodernist positions which tend to characterize narrative in terms of ideal 
templates that package descriptions of events (e.g. Gergen, 1999) and are even part of the ‘deep 
structure’ of understanding (White, 1978).  As Stokoe and Edwards (2006) show, DC resists 
these proto cognitivist moves (important though the work is in other ways) in favour of 
considering narratives as situated practices and purveyors of action. 
The stories offered by Carrie in the example above can illustrate some of these issues.  
Note first the description in lines 11-14: 
(and there was) a figure, (.) standi:ng  
(0.5) quite far (up) my garden (0.2) um:  
in a sor’ve night dress, 
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This is a description of a scene including vivid detail (‘quite far up’, ‘night dress’).  It is a 
description offered from an observer’s point of view (note that ‘quite far up’ is a description 
given in relation to the observer).  It is the kind of description, then, that works to entitle the 
speaker to the category of witness.  The same with the description of the noise in the second 
story as a ‘really deep growly noise’ – it is not a gloss or typification, but offers a sense of the 
noise as it sounded.  
A further element in Carrie’s second story is the use of ‘active voicing’.  In lines 38 and 
39 Carrie reports: ‘I >said to her y’know< why di’you make that noise.’ Here the 
actively voiced question neatly constructs Carrie’s first mundane inference.  Rather than being an 
inference about something paranormal it is simply that her friend had made the noise.  There is a 
lovely detail here.  Carrie inserts ‘y’know’ into this utterance just before the actively voiced 
question.  It  is easy to overlook such elements of talk or treat them as irrelevant clutter.  
However, as Edwards (1997) and others have shown they can be a consequential part of the 
achievement and management of shared knowledge.  In this case, the ‘y’know’ constructs the 
question as just what anyone might understandably be expected to ask; Carrie would know what 
she was doing in asking such a question.  Again, this works to establish her category membership 
as an ordinary person. 
The final thing to note is the construction of the sister’s response to the growly noise:  we 
both star’ed laugh:ing.  This pulls together a number of features of fact construction.  
Laughing operates to provide a world/psychology inference – it presents a stance on the sound 
that has the first understanding as not a paranormal one.  However, the description has this as a 
shared immediate response, therefore has it as both consensual and corroborated.  Then the 
reaction a few lines later is also presented as consensual – ‘we got quite freaked out’ (note the 
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‘we’) – and therefore the speaker uses her own construction of other’s actions to corroborate her 
account.  Again, this is the power of narrative of this kind – the author controls the content. 
The general point of this discussion has been to show the way that construction can be 
considered as an accomplishment of speakers and writers.  Given that it has such a status then 
one of the analytic tasks of DC is to document the procedures through which versions are 
solidified as factual, objective and independent of the speaker or writer.  We have illustrated 
some of the key procedures here but this an area of research that needs much more development.   
Mundane Epistemics 
One area that is, and should continue to be, a major focus of work is on what might be 
called mundane epistemics.  This is the study of knowledge and understanding as things that are 
practical and interactional.  Emanuel Schegloff (1991) picked up from Harold Garfinkel’s (1967) 
observation that shared knowledge can be treated as something procedural.  This transformed the 
traditional cognitive question of mental equivalence into a practical question of how particular 
member’s methods might be used to confirm (or deny) that knowledge is ‘held in common’.   
Drawing on conversation analytic findings Schegloff notes that understanding is something that 
is socially organized and something that is consequentially different in different places in 
conversation.  
Take invitations for example.  One crucial point where understanding is socially live is in 
the turn that follows an invitation (in conversation analysis the 2nd turn).  This is a place where a 
range of confusions can be attended to if need be.  The turn that follows is also crucial because 
the 2nd turn may reveal understanding that the recipient finds problematic, and that they can 
therefore fix in the 3rd turn.  In fact Schegloff (1992) suggests that 3rd turns are the last 
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structurally provided for place for sustaining shared understanding.  He emphasises the dangers 
(for relationships and individuals) that can arise from letting failures of understanding go by: 
When a source of misunderstanding escapes the multiple repair space, a whole institutional 
superstructure that is sustained through talk-in-interaction can be compromised.  And since 
virtually anything in the talk can be such a source of misunderstanding, the potential for trouble 
for that institutional superstructure can be vast.  It is against those systematic potentials for 
subversion of social order that repair after next turn is the last structurally provided defence 
(1992: 1337). 
In this world of mundane epistemics, common understanding is a procedural problem that is both 
an analytic topic for DC researchers and a practical issue for participants.  Understanding is not 
something floating in a phenomenological space but something structurally located with 
differential possibilities for checking and modifying.  There is no independent check on 
understanding outside of such procedures. 
Edwards (1999) further reworks the cognitivist notion of shared knowledge.  He notes 
that the traditional idea of shared knowledge implies agreement in mental representations of 
some kind.  However, if agreement is procedural rather than abstract then it is something to be 
done, displayed, invoked or denied.  Instead of being achieved through a mental calculus it is 
situated and defeasible; that is, it is open to reformulation and denial.  This reworking of 
agreement supplements Schegloff’s reworking of understanding.  Edwards additionally notes 
that the knowledge that is considered to be shared is, in the practical situations of life, 
inseparable from descriptions.  And as the central programmatic of discursive psychology has 
shown (picking up from Wittgenstein, sociology of scientific knowledge, post-structural 
philosophy) descriptions have their home as active elements of practices.  The general point here 
is that when we consider carefully the idea of shared or agreed knowledge in practice (that is, 
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from the point of view of the participants in an actual situation) issues of structure, procedure 
and description come to the fore.  In contrast, the cognitivist notion of knowledge is sustained by 
the world of theory or in the procedures of cognitive science where its status is achieved 
definitionally (Edwards & Potter, 1992).   
To take one final example of mundane epistemics, Heritage and Raymond’s (2005) 
studied the display of knowledge entitlement and authority.  Heritage has shown over a series of 
studies the way the particle ‘oh’ can suggest a ‘change of state’.  For example, in question-
answer sequences, the questioner’s ‘oh-receipt’ can mark a change of state and ratifies the 
answer as news; such receipts are absent in classroom or news interview contexts where the 
questioner is not projecting themselves as uninformed on a topic (see Heritage, 2005).  Oh 
receipts are bound up with epistemic issues of who knows something and who does not and they 
serve as an ongoing interactional marking of such matters.  Note again that such analyses does 
not make the same assumptions as cognitive psychological work on knowledge as the practices 
here are public, practical and conversational and their sufficiency is for those things. 
Heritage and Raymond (2005) build on this work and explore the relationship between 
oh-receipts and knowledge entitlement.  They suggest that ‘oh-receipts’ can be used to build 
epistemic authority with respect to another speaker.  Take the following: 
Eve: No I haven't seen it Jo saw it 'n she said 
 she f- depressed her ter[ribly 
Jon:          [Oh it's [terribly depressing.  
Lyn:          [Oh it's depressing.  
Heritage and Raymond notes that Jon and Lyn who have seen the film that is under discussion do 
agreement, but they oh-preface it.  By doing this they suggest that they have independent access 
to the film and therefore, just here, that they have epistemic priority relative to Eve.  Contrast the 
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Interviewer’s news receipts in lines 28 and 54 in the paranormal account, which defer epistemic 
authority to Carrie.  Heritage and Raymond suggest that conversation is suffused with indirect 
claims to authority of this kind where whose version is correct and who has the appropriate 
epistemic entitlement is acted out through different practices. 
CONSTRUCTIONISM WITHOUT LIMITS 
In this final main section we will consider some of what have often been treated as the 
limits of constructionist analysis.  We will press the case for DC as a thoroughgoing 
constructionism that does not exempt certain areas from study for one reason or another.  This 
section will thus lay out some of the arguments that discursive constructionism has provoked as 
well as indicating some of the areas of analytic development.  We will take the issue of limits in 
three parts.  The first will focus on basic arguments against thoroughgoing constructionism and 
particularly what have been called ‘death and furniture’ arguments.  The second will focus on 
issues of social structure, history and context.  The third will explore some of the analytic 
frontiers of discursive constructionism in respect to embodiment, emotion and perception. 
Furniture and Death 
There have been longstanding debates between the different varieties of constructionism 
and different forms of realism.  These debates are occasioned and local with different forms of 
constructionism (relativism, social constructivism, discourse analysis and so on) pitted against 
different forms of realism (e.g. realism, critical realism, Marxist materialism, experimental 
psychology).  Such debates pick up from longstanding philosophical disputes.  Although this is a 
picture with utility and it has been much used it is important to recognize the reflexive 
relationship between the picture and the argument(s) painted within it.  From a DC perspective 
‘the constructionism/realism’ debate is a literary construction.  Indeed, the DC perspective itself 
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is a literary creation, put together for this handbook, and inevitably (and usefully) systematizing 
and simplifying.  This is consistent with its epistemic assumptions.  And for all that DC is no less 
real, as sociology of scientific knowledge has shown us that such processes are generic, not just 
in the social and human ‘soft’ sciences, but across physics, astronomy and even mathematics (see 
Ashmore, Myers & Potter, 2002).   
One of the moves in this ‘debate between realism and constructionism’ (relativism, anti-
foundationalism) has been to offer ‘bottom line’ arguments that propose some bedrock of reality 
that places limits on what is constructed: 
When relativists start talking about the social construction of reality, truth, cognition, scientific 
knowledge, technical capacity, social structure and so on their realist opponents sooner or later 
start hitting the furniture, invoking the Holocaust, talking about rocks, guns, killing, human misery, 
tables and chairs. (Edwards, Ashmore & Potter, 1995, p 26). 
In their influential Death and Furniture (D&F) paper Edwards, Ashmore and Potter observe that 
there are two related argumentative tropes – the Furniture trope (which makes reference to 
tables, rocks, etc. as the reality that cannot be denied) and the Death trope (which invokes 
misery, genocide, poverty etc. as the reality that should not be denied).  D&F approached these 
moves in a manner consistent with its constructionist, relativist perspective.  That is, rather than 
attempt a direct rebuttal (that would risk getting caught up in the polarities and realist tropes of 
the moves) it focused on their rhetoric, exposing the way they were constructed to have their 
effect.  Furthermore, the literary form of the Death and Furniture paper was designed to draw 
attention to its own rhetoric in the process of its explication, conveying its argument as much in 
its literary form as its propositional content (and, of course, making it resist the kind of summary 
that sits easily in a Handbook chapter).   
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D&F uncovered the reflexive nature of authoring in the furniture and death tropes that 
carried the arguments.  That is, it showed the way these emblematic arguments were literary 
constructions assembled in way that precisely obscures their literary basis.  D&F highlights the 
realist’s dilemma.  The very act of constructing a piece of the external world (a rock, a table) that 
is non-represented, external, just there, is inevitably a construction, a representation in talk and 
text, or the semiotics of table thumping, and as such threatens immediately to turn round against 
the very position it is designed to support.  The point to highlight here is how the discursive and 
epistemic basis of DC leads it to focus on the constructive work of the different arguments 
invoked. 
Social Structure and Context 
There are various approaches to issues traditionally glossed as social structure, or history 
or context that formulate them as objects that transcend constructionist analysis.  Indeed, some 
approaches formulate the key problem in social analysis to be the joining of constructionist 
arenas to ‘the real’ by way of a complex set of argumentative and epistemic bolts – compare, for 
example, Fairclough (1995) and Burr (1999).  DC offers a number of ways of treating social 
structure and context as part of a coherent constructionist universe rather than having them as 
separate realms with contrasting epistemologies.  We will briefly consider three strands of 
argument – one that treats context as a member’s concern; one that treats social structure as 
ongoing accomplishment, and one that explores the way social structure is formulated and 
constructed in accounts.   
The issue of context has elicited wide-ranging debate.  One traditional social science 
approach, sometimes glossed as positivist or realist, attempts to understand the context of 
discourse through historical, theoretical, statistical or ethnographic means.  This is then used to 
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provide supposedly ‘broader’ or more ‘macro’ analyses of the discourse.  In contrast, Schegloff 
(1997b) presses the virtues of studying context through participants’ own orientations.  He notes 
that in any interaction there are a wide variety of possible relevant contextual particulars and the 
crucial issue is what contextual particulars the participants themselves treat as relevant.  It is not 
just that social scientists find people, according to Schegloff: 
to be characterizable as “president/assistant,” “chicano/black,” as “professor/student,” etc.  But 
that for them, at that moment, those are terms relevant for producing and interpreting conduct in 
the interaction’ (1992, p. 109).   
Furthermore, even when some contextual particular, structure or description has been shown to 
be relevant there is still an issue of how far it is consequential for the unfolding of the ongoing 
interaction.  For example, if a particular style of questioning is found to be central to classroom 
teaching there is still a further analytic challenge to show how this style of questioning is 
institutionally produced rather than being a style common elsewhere simply drawn on in a 
classroom practice. 
These are challenging issues for researchers and they have provoked considerable 
controversy (see Billig, 1999; Stokoe & Smithson, 2001; Wetherell, 1998 - and responses 
Schegloff, 1998, 1999).  Schegloff has not presented these arguments as part of a constructionist 
problematic.  Nevertheless, from DC they have a constructionist nucleus because they give 
primacy to the situated categorizations and displayed understandings of the participants and 
rigorously avoid the production of a privileged ‘off-stage’ story that situates and reframes the 
participants’ discourse (see Stokoe, in press).   
A second approach considers how social structure is an ongoing accomplishment of 
different parties.  Rather than treating action in a setting as contextually determined by the 
institutional context – school, law court, therapeutic session – this approach considers the way 
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different parties collaboratively and actively produce the relevant structures.  These structures 
are normative and inferential – they do not determine what goes on in, say, a medical 
consultation, but they do provide of the coherence of that interaction.  There is a now a mature 
and large scale research programme of this kind and many of the arguments and issues are 
familiar so we will not spend a great deal of time discussing it.  The classic treatments are 
available in Drew and Heritage (1992); methodological issues in studying institutional 
interaction are discussed in Heritage (2005) and for an extended research illustration see 
Clayman and Heritage (2002) on the news interview. 
The third and final research approach here is rather different, although complementary.  It 
considers the ways in which social structures of a various kinds are constructed in and through 
talk and what those constructions are used to do.  Studies of this kind have covered a range of 
topics that invoke constructions of social structure and organization including racism (e.g. 
Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2006), nationalism (e.g. Condor et al., 2006) and family (Gubrium 
& Holstein, 2000). 
For example Billig (1992) studied talk about the British royal family.  He aimed to show 
how people drew on, reproduced and reconstructed notions of privilege, equality, the nation state 
and morality as they argued about the role of the royal family in the life of the nation.  In 
particular, Billig highlighted a weave of contradictory and dilemmatic notions that were drawn 
on to obscure inequalities and legitimate current social arrangements.  For Billig, the participants 
are engaged in conversational ‘acts of settlement’: ‘common-sense talk about royalty settles 
ordinary people down into their place within the imagined national community’ (1992: 23).   
Billig suggests that common sense is fragmented in a way that trouble and conflict is 
rhetorically settled, and how the political status quo is perpetuated (see Billig et al., 1988).  It 
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provides one illustration of the way that social organization and structure can be studied as a 
flexible set of constructions that are drawn on as parts of broader practices of social legitimation 
(see also Wetherell & Potter, 1992).  In terms of our interest in systematic discursive 
constructionism we see in examples such as this a version of analysis that does not take a 
privileged analysts’ version of social structure and uses it to situate participants’ accounts.  
Instead the focus is on how participants themselves invoke, describe and reconstruct social 
structure in the course of their practices.  
Embodiment, emotion and perception  
Critics of constructionism from various perspectives have often picked up various 
‘psychological’ domains as limits or at least challenges to constructionist analysis (see e.g. Burr, 
1999).  The body, perception and emotion are three central examples.  In this final section we 
will indicate the sorts of ways in which these domains can be addressed in DC.   
One DC way into constructionism is deceptively simple, and that is to use video materials 
to analyse what is going on in a way that includes its ‘embodied’ and ‘physically situated’ 
nature.  In itself, of course, this is not a distinctively DC approach to research.  Indeed, the use of 
video might seem to suggest a vision of simple empiricism.  However, video materials are 
analysed in DC ways that keep the participants own orientations to what is going on at the fore 
(Heath, 2005).  Gaze and gesture, for example, are not studied for what the analyst can see going 
on, but for how they are coordinated with, and contributing to, the ongoing interaction for the 
participants of that interaction.  This approach contrasts with both traditional studies of non-
verbal behaviour that tend to see gesture in terms of information leakage that a skilled analyst 
can detect behind the backs of the participants, and traditional sociological analyses of the visual, 
that tend to interpret gesture and other visual elements according to theories from cultural studies 
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and semiotics.  With respect to DC, the visual (gesture, physical settings, and so on) are not the 
limits on what is constructed; instead they are precisely and centrally part of the constructed 
world of ongoing interaction. 
Another DC approach to embodiment is to consider bodily orientations in talk of a range 
of kinds.  This could involve constructions of bodies and embodiment (accounts, descriptions, 
formulations) rather in the manner of DC studies of ‘social structure’ and other objects of this 
kind.  Or it could involve meaningful bodily displays of various kinds.  For example, Wiggins 
(2002) studied expressions of ‘gustatory pleasure’ and in particular the sorts of mmms that 
people make when eating.  She showed the way the mmms are produced to deliver expressions 
of pleasure as spontaneous and immediate, but are also socially organized and communicative 
(coordinated between speakers and helping form actions such as food compliments).  They can 
be treated as ‘sensation receipts’, presenting the body as itself seeming to inform the assessment.   
Again, instead of the body offering a solid boundary to constructionist analysis it becomes 
something invoked, displayed and enacted in a manner that is susceptible to DC analysis. 
Emotion is similarly treated overwhelmingly in the social sciences as something 
emerging from the body, as something close to nature and rather distant from culture.  There is a 
relatively small literature on the social construction of emotion (see Harré, 1986 and the 
discussion in Chapter **, this volume).  DC research has started to explore this area of work.  
For example, Buttny (1993) considers some of the ways that emotion categories can be part of 
the formation of actions such as blamings and apologies.  Edwards (1997) considered the way 
emotion descriptions operate in relationship counselling talk.  Through a detailed examination of 
the different moves of the parties to the counselling Edwards shows that notions such as ‘anger’ 
and ‘upset’ can be used as parts of accounts which work to construct actions as reactions.  This 
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DC approach to emotion both brings it into analysis rather than having emotion a boundary or 
limit, and also highlights a realm of central human business virtually bypassed by traditional 
cognitive and cross cultural models of emotion. 
 Edwards and Buttny concentrate in particular on the use of emotion descriptions and 
categories.  Other work has considered emotion in terms of display.  For example, Heath (2002) 
considered the use of use gesture in medical consultation as patients displayed pain and 
suffering, and Hepburn (2004) focused on crying and the social, communicative and interactional 
organization of upset.   
A final domain that is sometimes seen as troubling for constructionist analysis is 
perception.  Indeed, perception and its associated tropes are historically and tropically bound up 
with empiricism and other foundational epistemic systems (Rorty, 1980).  Although perception 
has been undercut by a range of philosophical critiques from Quine through Hanson, Popper and 
Wittgenstein that highlight its conventional or theory laden nature (see Chalmers, 1992, for a 
useful review) the approach from DC has been to consider practices of seeing as topics for 
analysis.   
Some of the most powerful research in this tradition was conducted by Goodwin and 
Goodwin (e.g. 1996).  They have conducted a rigorous series of studies of looking, seeing and 
perception in the context of a range of professional settings.  For example, they researched the 
way air traffic controllers ‘see’ planes as part of getting their work done.  This work shows that 
perception is neither simple nor is it a purely mental phenomenon sitting behind cognition and 
causing interaction.   Perception is profoundly socially organized and can be an important and 
consequential area for constructionist study.    
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In this final section we have considered the way a range of conventional limits to 
constructionist analysis – furniture and objects, death, social structure, context, the body, 
emotion, and perception – can become major topics of discursive constructionist study.  Put 
another way, we have noted the way that these phenomena can come within the purview of 
constructionism rather than being rogue objects that require their own special analytic methods 
(phenomenology, Marxism, or whatever). 
Discursive constructionism has been a literary construction of this chapter, but it is 
reflexively and epistemically at peace and with that status.  As Davies (1998), Hepburn (2000) 
and Smith (1988) have shown amongst others, this reflexive construction is neither a requirement 
to accept that ‘anything goes’ (that strange realist construction) nor that constructionists are 
required to work without any personal commitment to social critique, feminism or visions of 
transformation.  This is not to say that DC is a coherent and sealed system – there are a range of 
creative tensions between, for example, the more conversation analytic and more discourse 
analytic moments, or between more epistemic focused and more ontologically focused versions 
of constructionism.  Such tensions provide one of the motors for future development. 
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